Lattices and Topology

Guram Bezhanishvili and Mamuka Jibladze

ESSLLI'08 11-15.VIII.2008

Lecture 5: Applications to logic

• We have described the Priestley topology on the set of prime filters of a bounded distributive lattice.

- We have described the Priestley topology on the set of prime filters of a bounded distributive lattice.
- We have defined Priestley spaces as ordered Stone spaces satisfying the Priestley separation axiom.

- We have described the Priestley topology on the set of prime filters of a bounded distributive lattice.
- We have defined Priestley spaces as ordered Stone spaces satisfying the Priestley separation axiom.
- We showed that the space of prime filters of a bounded distributive lattice is a Priestley space.

- We have described the Priestley topology on the set of prime filters of a bounded distributive lattice.
- We have defined Priestley spaces as ordered Stone spaces satisfying the Priestley separation axiom.
- We showed that the space of prime filters of a bounded distributive lattice is a Priestley space.
- We described the resulting Priestley duality between bounded distributive lattices and Priestley spaces.

- We have described the Priestley topology on the set of prime filters of a bounded distributive lattice.
- We have defined Priestley spaces as ordered Stone spaces satisfying the Priestley separation axiom.
- We showed that the space of prime filters of a bounded distributive lattice is a Priestley space.
- We described the resulting Priestley duality between bounded distributive lattices and Priestley spaces.
- We saw how the Priestley duality results in the representation of a bounded distributive lattice as the lattice of clopen upsets of a Priestley space.

• We saw how the Birkhoff duality from lecture 2 is a particular case of the Priestley duality.

- We saw how the Birkhoff duality from lecture 2 is a particular case of the Priestley duality.
- We derived the Stone duality between Boolean lattices and Stone spaces from the Priestley duality.

- We saw how the Birkhoff duality from lecture 2 is a particular case of the Priestley duality.
- We derived the Stone duality between Boolean lattices and Stone spaces from the Priestley duality.
- We saw how the Stone duality results in the representation of Boolean lattices as lattices of clopen sets of a Stone space.

- We saw how the Birkhoff duality from lecture 2 is a particular case of the Priestley duality.
- We derived the Stone duality between Boolean lattices and Stone spaces from the Priestley duality.
- We saw how the Stone duality results in the representation of Boolean lattices as lattices of clopen sets of a Stone space.
- We introduced Esakia spaces and obtained the Esakia duality between Heyting lattices and Esakia spaces from the Priestley duality.

- We saw how the Birkhoff duality from lecture 2 is a particular case of the Priestley duality.
- We derived the Stone duality between Boolean lattices and Stone spaces from the Priestley duality.
- We saw how the Stone duality results in the representation of Boolean lattices as lattices of clopen sets of a Stone space.
- We introduced Esakia spaces and obtained the Esakia duality between Heyting lattices and Esakia spaces from the Priestley duality.
- We saw how the Esakia duality gives representation of Heyting lattices as lattices of clopen upsets of Esakia spaces.

• Spectral duality

- Spectral duality
- Distributive lattices in logic

- Spectral duality
- Distributive lattices in logic
- Relational completeness of IPC and CPC

- Spectral duality
- Distributive lattices in logic
- Relational completeness of IPC and CPC
- Topological completeness of IPC and CPC

In the previous lecture we showed how to develop a nice representation of distributive, Heyting, and Boolean lattices by means of Priestley, Esakia, and Stone spaces, respectively.

In the previous lecture we showed how to develop a nice representation of distributive, Heyting, and Boolean lattices by means of Priestley, Esakia, and Stone spaces, respectively.

One disadvantage of the Priestley duality is that it requires both topology and order to represent distributive lattices.

In the previous lecture we showed how to develop a nice representation of distributive, Heyting, and Boolean lattices by means of Priestley, Esakia, and Stone spaces, respectively.

One disadvantage of the Priestley duality is that it requires both topology and order to represent distributive lattices. We will show that we can do away with the order.

In the previous lecture we showed how to develop a nice representation of distributive, Heyting, and Boolean lattices by means of Priestley, Esakia, and Stone spaces, respectively.

One disadvantage of the Priestley duality is that it requires both topology and order to represent distributive lattices. We will show that we can do away with the order.

To see this, let *L* be a bounded distributive lattice.

In the previous lecture we showed how to develop a nice representation of distributive, Heyting, and Boolean lattices by means of Priestley, Esakia, and Stone spaces, respectively.

One disadvantage of the Priestley duality is that it requires both topology and order to represent distributive lattices. We will show that we can do away with the order.

To see this, let *L* be a bounded distributive lattice. We again work with the set $\mathscr{X}(L)$ of prime filters of *L*.

In the previous lecture we showed how to develop a nice representation of distributive, Heyting, and Boolean lattices by means of Priestley, Esakia, and Stone spaces, respectively.

One disadvantage of the Priestley duality is that it requires both topology and order to represent distributive lattices. We will show that we can do away with the order.

To see this, let *L* be a bounded distributive lattice. We again work with the set $\mathscr{X}(L)$ of prime filters of *L*. But now we ignore set-theoretic inclusion on prime filters.

In the previous lecture we showed how to develop a nice representation of distributive, Heyting, and Boolean lattices by means of Priestley, Esakia, and Stone spaces, respectively.

One disadvantage of the Priestley duality is that it requires both topology and order to represent distributive lattices. We will show that we can do away with the order.

To see this, let *L* be a bounded distributive lattice. We again work with the set $\mathscr{X}(L)$ of prime filters of *L*. But now we ignore set-theoretic inclusion on prime filters. Instead we define a different topology on $\mathscr{X}(L)$.

In the previous lecture we showed how to develop a nice representation of distributive, Heyting, and Boolean lattices by means of Priestley, Esakia, and Stone spaces, respectively.

One disadvantage of the Priestley duality is that it requires both topology and order to represent distributive lattices. We will show that we can do away with the order.

To see this, let *L* be a bounded distributive lattice. We again work with the set $\mathscr{X}(L)$ of prime filters of *L*. But now we ignore set-theoretic inclusion on prime filters. Instead we define a different topology on $\mathscr{X}(L)$.

This is how it was done originally by Marshall Stone back in 1937.

In the previous lecture we showed how to develop a nice representation of distributive, Heyting, and Boolean lattices by means of Priestley, Esakia, and Stone spaces, respectively.

One disadvantage of the Priestley duality is that it requires both topology and order to represent distributive lattices. We will show that we can do away with the order.

To see this, let *L* be a bounded distributive lattice. We again work with the set $\mathscr{X}(L)$ of prime filters of *L*. But now we ignore set-theoretic inclusion on prime filters. Instead we define a different topology on $\mathscr{X}(L)$.

This is how it was done originally by Marshall Stone back in 1937. For some this is the most natural way to define topology on the dual of L.

We look at the set $S = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$.

We look at the set $S = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$.

Since $\phi(0) = \emptyset$, $\phi(1) = \mathscr{X}(L)$, and $\phi(a \wedge b) = \phi(a) \cap \phi(b)$

We look at the set $S = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$.

Since $\phi(0) = \emptyset$, $\phi(1) = \mathscr{X}(L)$, and $\phi(a \land b) = \phi(a) \cap \phi(b)$, \mathcal{S} contains \emptyset , $\mathscr{X}(L)$ and is closed under finite intersections.

We look at the set $S = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$.

Since $\phi(0) = \emptyset$, $\phi(1) = \mathscr{X}(L)$, and $\phi(a \land b) = \phi(a) \cap \phi(b)$, S contains \emptyset , $\mathscr{X}(L)$ and is closed under finite intersections.

In addition, as $\phi(a \lor b) = \phi(a) \cup \phi(b)$, S is closed under finite unions.

We look at the set $S = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$.

Since $\phi(0) = \emptyset$, $\phi(1) = \mathscr{X}(L)$, and $\phi(a \land b) = \phi(a) \cap \phi(b)$, S contains \emptyset , $\mathscr{X}(L)$ and is closed under finite intersections.

In addition, as $\phi(a \lor b) = \phi(a) \cup \phi(b)$, S is closed under finite unions. But in general S is not closed under arbitrary unions.

We look at the set $S = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$.

Since $\phi(0) = \emptyset$, $\phi(1) = \mathscr{X}(L)$, and $\phi(a \land b) = \phi(a) \cap \phi(b)$, S contains \emptyset , $\mathscr{X}(L)$ and is closed under finite intersections.

In addition, as $\phi(a \lor b) = \phi(a) \cup \phi(b)$, S is closed under finite unions. But in general S is not closed under arbitrary unions. Thus it does not form a topology.

We look at the set $S = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$.

Since $\phi(0) = \emptyset$, $\phi(1) = \mathscr{X}(L)$, and $\phi(a \land b) = \phi(a) \cap \phi(b)$, \mathcal{S} contains \emptyset , $\mathscr{X}(L)$ and is closed under finite intersections.

In addition, as $\phi(a \lor b) = \phi(a) \cup \phi(b)$, S is closed under finite unions. But in general S is not closed under arbitrary unions. Thus it does not form a topology.

We generate a topology from \mathcal{S} by closing \mathcal{S} under arbitrary unions.

We look at the set $S = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$.

Since $\phi(0) = \emptyset$, $\phi(1) = \mathscr{X}(L)$, and $\phi(a \land b) = \phi(a) \cap \phi(b)$, \mathcal{S} contains \emptyset , $\mathscr{X}(L)$ and is closed under finite intersections.

In addition, as $\phi(a \lor b) = \phi(a) \cup \phi(b)$, S is closed under finite unions. But in general S is not closed under arbitrary unions. Thus it does not form a topology.

We generate a topology from S by closing S under arbitrary unions. We call the obtained topology the spectral topology and denote it by τ_S .

Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S .

Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S . How are these two topologies related to each other?

Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S . How are these two topologies related to each other?

We recall that τ_P is generated by $\mathscr{B} = \{\phi(a) - \phi(b) : a, b \in L\}$
Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S . How are these two topologies related to each other?

We recall that τ_P is generated by $\mathscr{B} = \{\phi(a) - \phi(b) : a, b \in L\}$ and τ_S is generated by $\mathcal{S} = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$.

Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S . How are these two topologies related to each other?

We recall that τ_P is generated by $\mathscr{B} = \{\phi(a) - \phi(b) : a, b \in L\}$ and τ_S is generated by $\mathcal{S} = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$. It follows at once that τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P , that is $\tau_S \subseteq \tau_P$.

Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S . How are these two topologies related to each other?

We recall that τ_P is generated by $\mathscr{B} = \{\phi(a) - \phi(b) : a, b \in L\}$ and τ_S is generated by $\mathcal{S} = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$. It follows at once that τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P , that is $\tau_S \subseteq \tau_P$.

But more is true.

Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S . How are these two topologies related to each other?

We recall that τ_P is generated by $\mathscr{B} = \{\phi(a) - \phi(b) : a, b \in L\}$ and τ_S is generated by $\mathcal{S} = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$. It follows at once that τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P , that is $\tau_S \subseteq \tau_P$.

But more is true. In fact, each element of \mathcal{B} is the intersection of an element of \mathcal{S} and set-theoretic complement of an element of \mathcal{S} .

Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S . How are these two topologies related to each other?

We recall that τ_P is generated by $\mathscr{B} = \{\phi(a) - \phi(b) : a, b \in L\}$ and τ_S is generated by $\mathcal{S} = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$. It follows at once that τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P , that is $\tau_S \subseteq \tau_P$.

But more is true. In fact, each element of \mathscr{B} is the intersection of an element of \mathcal{S} and set-theoretic complement of an element of \mathcal{S} . Thus τ_P is generated by the set

 $\{U \cap F : U \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } \mathscr{X}(L) - F \in \mathcal{S}\}.$

Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S . How are these two topologies related to each other?

We recall that τ_P is generated by $\mathscr{B} = \{\phi(a) - \phi(b) : a, b \in L\}$ and τ_S is generated by $\mathcal{S} = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$. It follows at once that τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P , that is $\tau_S \subseteq \tau_P$.

But more is true. In fact, each element of \mathscr{B} is the intersection of an element of \mathcal{S} and set-theoretic complement of an element of \mathcal{S} . Thus τ_P is generated by the set

$$\{U \cap F : U \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } \mathscr{X}(L) - F \in \mathcal{S}\}.$$

When one topology is obtained from another this way, it is known in the literature as the patch topology.

Thus we have two topologies on $\mathscr{X}(L)$ —the Priestley topology τ_P and the spectral topology τ_S . How are these two topologies related to each other?

We recall that τ_P is generated by $\mathscr{B} = \{\phi(a) - \phi(b) : a, b \in L\}$ and τ_S is generated by $\mathcal{S} = \{\phi(a) : a \in L\}$. It follows at once that τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P , that is $\tau_S \subseteq \tau_P$.

But more is true. In fact, each element of \mathscr{B} is the intersection of an element of \mathcal{S} and set-theoretic complement of an element of \mathcal{S} . Thus τ_P is generated by the set

$$\{U \cap F : U \in \mathcal{S} \text{ and } \mathscr{X}(L) - F \in \mathcal{S}\}.$$

When one topology is obtained from another this way, it is known in the literature as the patch topology. Therefore τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S .

Consequently we can recover the Priestley topology τ_P from the spectral topology τ_S by taking the patch topology of τ_S .

Consequently we can recover the Priestley topology τ_P from the spectral topology τ_S by taking the patch topology of τ_S .

But how can we recover set-theoretic inclusion from τ_S ?

Consequently we can recover the Priestley topology τ_P from the spectral topology τ_S by taking the patch topology of τ_S .

But how can we recover set-theoretic inclusion from τ_S ? This can be done through the specialization order.

Consequently we can recover the Priestley topology τ_P from the spectral topology τ_S by taking the patch topology of τ_S .

But how can we recover set-theoretic inclusion from τ_S ? This can be done through the specialization order.

Lemma: \subseteq is the specialization order of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Consequently we can recover the Priestley topology τ_P from the spectral topology τ_S by taking the patch topology of τ_S .

But how can we recover set-theoretic inclusion from τ_S ? This can be done through the specialization order.

Lemma: \subseteq is the specialization order of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Proof: For two prime filters x, y we have $x \subseteq y$ iff $(\forall a \in L)(a \in x \text{ implies } a \in y)$.

Consequently we can recover the Priestley topology τ_P from the spectral topology τ_S by taking the patch topology of τ_S .

But how can we recover set-theoretic inclusion from τ_S ? This can be done through the specialization order.

Lemma: \subseteq is the specialization order of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Proof: For two prime filters x, y we have $x \subseteq y$ iff $(\forall a \in L)(a \in x \text{ implies } a \in y)$. Therefore $x \subseteq y$ iff $(\forall a \in L)(x \in \phi(a) \text{ implies } y \in \phi(a))$.

Consequently we can recover the Priestley topology τ_P from the spectral topology τ_S by taking the patch topology of τ_S .

But how can we recover set-theoretic inclusion from τ_S ? This can be done through the specialization order.

Lemma: \subseteq is the specialization order of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Proof: For two prime filters x, y we have $x \subseteq y$ iff $(\forall a \in L)(a \in x \text{ implies } a \in y)$. Therefore $x \subseteq y$ iff $(\forall a \in L)(x \in \phi(a) \text{ implies } y \in \phi(a))$. Since S generates τ_S , it follows that $x \subseteq y$ iff $(\forall U \in \tau_S)(x \in U \text{ implies } y \in U)$.

Consequently we can recover the Priestley topology τ_P from the spectral topology τ_S by taking the patch topology of τ_S .

But how can we recover set-theoretic inclusion from τ_S ? This can be done through the specialization order.

Lemma: \subseteq is the specialization order of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Proof: For two prime filters x, y we have $x \subseteq y$ iff $(\forall a \in L)(a \in x \text{ implies } a \in y)$. Therefore $x \subseteq y$ iff $(\forall a \in L)(x \in \phi(a) \text{ implies } y \in \phi(a))$. Since S generates τ_S , it follows that $x \subseteq y$ iff $(\forall U \in \tau_S)(x \in U \text{ implies } y \in U)$. Thus \subseteq is the specialization order of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S and \subseteq is the specialization order of τ_S .

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S and \subseteq is the specialization order of τ_S . Thus we can recover the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ from the space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S and \subseteq is the specialization order of τ_S . Thus we can recover the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ from the space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

How do we go the other way around?

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S and \subseteq is the specialization order of τ_S . Thus we can recover the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ from the space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

How do we go the other way around? That is, how do we get τ_S from $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$?

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S and \subseteq is the specialization order of τ_S . Thus we can recover the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ from the space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

How do we go the other way around? That is, how do we get τ_S from $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$?

We simply take open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)!$

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S and \subseteq is the specialization order of τ_S . Thus we can recover the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ from the space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

How do we go the other way around? That is, how do we get τ_S from $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$?

We simply take open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)!$

Lemma: τ_S consists of the open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$.

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S and \subseteq is the specialization order of τ_S . Thus we can recover the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ from the space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

How do we go the other way around? That is, how do we get τ_S from $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$?

We simply take open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)!$

Lemma: τ_S consists of the open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$.

Proof: We already saw that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly the subsets of $\mathscr{X}(L)$ of the form $\phi(a)$ for some $a \in L$.

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S and \subseteq is the specialization order of τ_S . Thus we can recover the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ from the space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

How do we go the other way around? That is, how do we get τ_S from $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$?

We simply take open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)!$

Lemma: τ_S consists of the open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$.

Proof: We already saw that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly the subsets of $\mathscr{X}(L)$ of the form $\phi(a)$ for some $a \in L$. Therefore clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly S.

Consequently, in the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, τ_P is the patch topology of τ_S and \subseteq is the specialization order of τ_S . Thus we can recover the Priestley space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ from the space $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

How do we go the other way around? That is, how do we get τ_S from $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$?

We simply take open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)!$

Lemma: τ_S consists of the open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$.

Proof: We already saw that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly the subsets of $\mathscr{X}(L)$ of the form $\phi(a)$ for some $a \in L$. Therefore clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly S. Since open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are obtained as the unions of clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, we conclude that τ_S is exactly the open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$.

Therefore we obtain full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Therefore we obtain full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Given $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, we take the open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ to obtain $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$;

Therefore we obtain full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$.

Given $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$, we take the open upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ to obtain $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$; and conversely, given $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ we take the patch topology of τ_S with the specialization order of τ_S to obtain $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$.

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*.

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

Since τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P and τ_P is compact, it follows that so is τ_S .

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

Since τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P and τ_P is compact, it follows that so is τ_S .

We show that τ_S is T_0 .

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

Since τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P and τ_P is compact, it follows that so is τ_S .

We show that τ_S is T_0 . Let $x \neq y$.

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

Since τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P and τ_P is compact, it follows that so is τ_S .

We show that τ_S is T_0 . Let $x \neq y$. Then either $x \not\subseteq y$ or $y \not\subseteq x$.

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

Since τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P and τ_P is compact, it follows that so is τ_S .

We show that τ_S is T_0 . Let $x \neq y$. Then either $x \not\subseteq y$ or $y \not\subseteq x$. Without loss of generality we may assume that $x \not\subseteq y$.

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

Since τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P and τ_P is compact, it follows that so is τ_S .

We show that τ_S is T_0 . Let $x \neq y$. Then either $x \not\subseteq y$ or $y \not\subseteq x$. Without loss of generality we may assume that $x \not\subseteq y$. Therefore there exists $a \in x - y$.
What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

Since τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P and τ_P is compact, it follows that so is τ_S .

We show that τ_S is T_0 . Let $x \neq y$. Then either $x \not\subseteq y$ or $y \not\subseteq x$. Without loss of generality we may assume that $x \not\subseteq y$. Therefore there exists $a \in x - y$. Thus $x \in \phi(a)$ and $y \notin \phi(a)$.

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

Since τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P and τ_P is compact, it follows that so is τ_S .

We show that τ_S is T_0 . Let $x \neq y$. Then either $x \not\subseteq y$ or $y \not\subseteq x$. Without loss of generality we may assume that $x \not\subseteq y$. Therefore there exists $a \in x - y$. Thus $x \in \phi(a)$ and $y \notin \phi(a)$. This means that there exists a τ_S -open set containing x and missing y.

What we haven't addressed yet is an abstract topological characterization of those spaces which are homeomorphic to $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*. We do this now.

Since τ_S is a subtopology of τ_P and τ_P is compact, it follows that so is τ_S .

We show that τ_S is T_0 . Let $x \neq y$. Then either $x \not\subseteq y$ or $y \not\subseteq x$. Without loss of generality we may assume that $x \not\subseteq y$. Therefore there exists $a \in x - y$. Thus $x \in \phi(a)$ and $y \notin \phi(a)$. This means that there exists a τ_S -open set containing x and missing y. Consequently τ_S is T_0 .

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact.

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact. The proof of this fact requires some work.

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact. The proof of this fact requires some work. We skip the details.

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact. The proof of this fact requires some work. We skip the details.

As a result, we obtain that the family $\mathcal{E}(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ of compact open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a bounded sublattice of τ_S which generates the topology τ_S .

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact. The proof of this fact requires some work. We skip the details.

As a result, we obtain that the family $\mathcal{E}(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ of compact open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a bounded sublattice of τ_S which generates the topology τ_S . Such spaces are usually called coherent.

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact. The proof of this fact requires some work. We skip the details.

As a result, we obtain that the family $\mathcal{E}(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ of compact open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a bounded sublattice of τ_S which generates the topology τ_S . Such spaces are usually called coherent.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is T_0 , compact, and coherent.

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact. The proof of this fact requires some work. We skip the details.

As a result, we obtain that the family $\mathcal{E}(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ of compact open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a bounded sublattice of τ_S which generates the topology τ_S . Such spaces are usually called coherent.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is T_0 , compact, and coherent. In fact, $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is also a sober space.

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact. The proof of this fact requires some work. We skip the details.

As a result, we obtain that the family $\mathcal{E}(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ of compact open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a bounded sublattice of τ_S which generates the topology τ_S . Such spaces are usually called coherent.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is T_0 , compact, and coherent. In fact, $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is also a sober space. Because of the lack of time we skip the details.

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact. The proof of this fact requires some work. We skip the details.

As a result, we obtain that the family $\mathcal{E}(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ of compact open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a bounded sublattice of τ_S which generates the topology τ_S . Such spaces are usually called coherent.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is T_0 , compact, and coherent. In fact, $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is also a sober space. Because of the lack of time we skip the details.

Thus we obtain that $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is compact, coherent, and sober.

In addition, we have that the clopen upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ are exactly those open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ which are compact. The proof of this fact requires some work. We skip the details.

As a result, we obtain that the family $\mathcal{E}(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ of compact open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a bounded sublattice of τ_S which generates the topology τ_S . Such spaces are usually called coherent.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is T_0 , compact, and coherent. In fact, $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is also a sober space. Because of the lack of time we skip the details.

Thus we obtain that $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is compact, coherent, and sober.

Definition: We call a space spectral if it is compact, coherent, and sober.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a spectral space.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a spectral space. Moreover, since there is a full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and each Priestley space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ for some bounded distributive lattice L,

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a spectral space. Moreover, since there is a full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and each Priestley space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*, we obtain that each spectral space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a spectral space. Moreover, since there is a full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and each Priestley space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*, we obtain that each spectral space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*.

This establishes several theorems at once.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a spectral space. Moreover, since there is a full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and each Priestley space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*, we obtain that each spectral space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*.

This establishes several theorems at once. For one, we obtain that there is a complete balance between Priestley spaces and spectral spaces.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a spectral space. Moreover, since there is a full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and each Priestley space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*, we obtain that each spectral space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*.

This establishes several theorems at once. For one, we obtain that there is a complete balance between Priestley spaces and spectral spaces. This result was first established by Cornish back in 1975.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a spectral space. Moreover, since there is a full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and each Priestley space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*, we obtain that each spectral space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*.

This establishes several theorems at once. For one, we obtain that there is a complete balance between Priestley spaces and spectral spaces. This result was first established by Cornish back in 1975.

It also shows that there's a complete balance between bounded distributive lattices and spectral spaces—a result going back to Stone.

Thus $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ is a spectral space. Moreover, since there is a full balance between $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ and $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ and each Priestley space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*, we obtain that each spectral space is of the form $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_S)$ for some bounded distributive lattice *L*.

This establishes several theorems at once. For one, we obtain that there is a complete balance between Priestley spaces and spectral spaces. This result was first established by Cornish back in 1975.

It also shows that there's a complete balance between bounded distributive lattices and spectral spaces—a result going back to Stone. In particular, this gives us another representation theorem for bounded distributive lattices:

Stone's representation of bounded distributive lattices: Each bounded distributive lattice is represented as the lattice of compact open subsets of a spectral space.

Stone's representation of bounded distributive lattices: Each bounded distributive lattice is represented as the lattice of compact open subsets of a spectral space.

In particular, this implies the following representation of bounded distributive lattices.

Stone's representation of bounded distributive lattices: Each bounded distributive lattice is represented as the lattice of compact open subsets of a spectral space.

In particular, this implies the following representation of bounded distributive lattices.

Topological representation theorem: Each bounded distributive lattice is isomorphic to a sublattice of τ_S .

Stone's representation of bounded distributive lattices: Each bounded distributive lattice is represented as the lattice of compact open subsets of a spectral space.

In particular, this implies the following representation of bounded distributive lattices.

Topological representation theorem: Each bounded distributive lattice is isomorphic to a sublattice of τ_S . Therefore each bounded distributive lattice can be represented as a sublattice of the lattice of open subsets of some topological space.

Remark: Note that in fact we have several topological representation theorems for bounded distributive lattices.

Remark: Note that in fact we have several topological representation theorems for bounded distributive lattices.

In Lecture 2 we showed that each bounded distributive lattice *L* is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq)$.

Remark: Note that in fact we have several topological representation theorems for bounded distributive lattices.

In Lecture 2 we showed that each bounded distributive lattice *L* is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq)$. This in fact is already a topological representation of *L* because we can view $\mathscr{X}(L)$ as a topological space with the Alexandroff topology τ_{\subseteq} .

Remark: Note that in fact we have several topological representation theorems for bounded distributive lattices.

In Lecture 2 we showed that each bounded distributive lattice *L* is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq)$. This in fact is already a topological representation of *L* because we can view $\mathscr{X}(L)$ as a topological space with the Alexandroff topology τ_{\subseteq} .

In Lecture 4 we showed that *L* is isomorphic to the lattice of clopen upsets of the Priestley dual $L_* = (\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ of *L*.

Remark: Note that in fact we have several topological representation theorems for bounded distributive lattices.

In Lecture 2 we showed that each bounded distributive lattice *L* is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq)$. This in fact is already a topological representation of *L* because we can view $\mathscr{X}(L)$ as a topological space with the Alexandroff topology τ_{\subseteq} .

In Lecture 4 we showed that *L* is isomorphic to the lattice of clopen upsets of the Priestley dual $L_* = (\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ of *L*. This can be viewed as another topological representation of *L* since *L* becomes isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_P)$.

Remark: Note that in fact we have several topological representation theorems for bounded distributive lattices.

In Lecture 2 we showed that each bounded distributive lattice *L* is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq)$. This in fact is already a topological representation of *L* because we can view $\mathscr{X}(L)$ as a topological space with the Alexandroff topology τ_{\subseteq} .

In Lecture 4 we showed that *L* is isomorphic to the lattice of clopen upsets of the Priestley dual $L_* = (\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ of *L*. This can be viewed as another topological representation of *L* since *L* becomes isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_P)$.

In a sense, the topological representation that we obtained in this lecture is the "most economical"

Remark: Note that in fact we have several topological representation theorems for bounded distributive lattices.

In Lecture 2 we showed that each bounded distributive lattice *L* is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq)$. This in fact is already a topological representation of *L* because we can view $\mathscr{X}(L)$ as a topological space with the Alexandroff topology τ_{\subseteq} .

In Lecture 4 we showed that *L* is isomorphic to the lattice of clopen upsets of the Priestley dual $L_* = (\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ of *L*. This can be viewed as another topological representation of *L* since *L* becomes isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_P)$.

In a sense, the topological representation that we obtained in this lecture is the "most economical" because the spectral topology is in fact the intersection of the Alexandroff and the Priestley topologies.

Remark: Note that in fact we have several topological representation theorems for bounded distributive lattices.

In Lecture 2 we showed that each bounded distributive lattice *L* is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of upsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq)$. This in fact is already a topological representation of *L* because we can view $\mathscr{X}(L)$ as a topological space with the Alexandroff topology τ_{\subseteq} .

In Lecture 4 we showed that *L* is isomorphic to the lattice of clopen upsets of the Priestley dual $L_* = (\mathscr{X}(L), \subseteq, \tau_P)$ of *L*. This can be viewed as another topological representation of *L* since *L* becomes isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of open subsets of $(\mathscr{X}(L), \tau_P)$.

In a sense, the topological representation that we obtained in this lecture is the "most economical" because the spectral topology is in fact the intersection of the Alexandroff and the Priestley topologies. That is, $\tau_S = \tau_{\Box} \cap \tau_P$.

As a result, we obtain two dualities for bounded distributive lattices.

As a result, we obtain two dualities for bounded distributive lattices. One is the Priestley duality.

As a result, we obtain two dualities for bounded distributive lattices. One is the Priestley duality. The other is the spectral duality.
As a result, we obtain two dualities for bounded distributive lattices. One is the Priestley duality. The other is the spectral duality. Moreover, in a sense, the Priestley and spectral dualities are different sides of the same coin,

As a result, we obtain two dualities for bounded distributive lattices. One is the Priestley duality. The other is the spectral duality. Moreover, in a sense, the Priestley and spectral dualities are different sides of the same coin, as follows from Cornish's theorem.

As a result, we obtain two dualities for bounded distributive lattices. One is the Priestley duality. The other is the spectral duality. Moreover, in a sense, the Priestley and spectral dualities are different sides of the same coin, as follows from Cornish's theorem.

Thus we can develop a duality for distributive lattices by means of either topology and order—Priestley duality—where topology behaves rather nicely;

As a result, we obtain two dualities for bounded distributive lattices. One is the Priestley duality. The other is the spectral duality. Moreover, in a sense, the Priestley and spectral dualities are different sides of the same coin, as follows from Cornish's theorem.

Thus we can develop a duality for distributive lattices by means of either topology and order—Priestley duality—where topology behaves rather nicely; or only by means of topology—spectral duality—but then the topology is not as nice as in the other case.

It is a tradeoff;

It is a tradeoff; and we invite the audience to choose for themselves which duality is their favorite.

It is a tradeoff; and we invite the audience to choose for themselves which duality is their favorite. We only mention that there is yet another duality for bounded distributive lattices by means of bitopological spaces,

It is a tradeoff; and we invite the audience to choose for themselves which duality is their favorite. We only mention that there is yet another duality for bounded distributive lattices by means of bitopological spaces, but it is beyond this course.

It is a tradeoff; and we invite the audience to choose for themselves which duality is their favorite. We only mention that there is yet another duality for bounded distributive lattices by means of bitopological spaces, but it is beyond this course.

We refer the interested reader to the following paper, which develops it in detail:

It is a tradeoff; and we invite the audience to choose for themselves which duality is their favorite. We only mention that there is yet another duality for bounded distributive lattices by means of bitopological spaces, but it is beyond this course.

We refer the interested reader to the following paper, which develops it in detail:

G. Bezhanishvili, N. Bezhanishvili, D. Gabelaia, A. Kurz. Bitopological duality for distributive lattices and Heyting algebras, available at http://www.cs.le.ac.uk/people/nb118/ Publications/PairwiseStone.pdf

We conclude this series of lectures by showing how one can apply the developed theory to obtain various completeness results in logic.

We conclude this series of lectures by showing how one can apply the developed theory to obtain various completeness results in logic.

The representation theorems that we obtained in previous lectures readily provide completeness theorems for the following propositional logical systems:

We conclude this series of lectures by showing how one can apply the developed theory to obtain various completeness results in logic.

The representation theorems that we obtained in previous lectures readily provide completeness theorems for the following propositional logical systems: Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC),

We conclude this series of lectures by showing how one can apply the developed theory to obtain various completeness results in logic.

The representation theorems that we obtained in previous lectures readily provide completeness theorems for the following propositional logical systems: Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC), Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC),

We conclude this series of lectures by showing how one can apply the developed theory to obtain various completeness results in logic.

The representation theorems that we obtained in previous lectures readily provide completeness theorems for the following propositional logical systems: Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC), Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC), and their implication-free fragments.

We conclude this series of lectures by showing how one can apply the developed theory to obtain various completeness results in logic.

The representation theorems that we obtained in previous lectures readily provide completeness theorems for the following propositional logical systems: Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC), Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC), and their implication-free fragments.

Formulæ of these calculi are built from propositional variables *p*, *q*, ...,

We conclude this series of lectures by showing how one can apply the developed theory to obtain various completeness results in logic.

The representation theorems that we obtained in previous lectures readily provide completeness theorems for the following propositional logical systems: Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC), Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC), and their implication-free fragments.

Formulæ of these calculi are built from propositional variables p, q, ..., logical constants \top ("true") and \perp ("false"),

We conclude this series of lectures by showing how one can apply the developed theory to obtain various completeness results in logic.

The representation theorems that we obtained in previous lectures readily provide completeness theorems for the following propositional logical systems: Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC), Classical Propositional Calculus (CPC), and their implication-free fragments.

Formulæ of these calculi are built from propositional variables p, q, ..., logical constants \top ("true") and \perp ("false"), and logical connectives \land (conjunction), \lor (disjunction), and \rightarrow (implication).

One possible description of these systems is based on sequent calculus.

One possible description of these systems is based on sequent calculus.

Recall that a sequent $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ is an ordered pair where $\Gamma = \varphi_1, ..., \varphi_m$ and $\Delta = \psi_1, ..., \psi_n$ are (possibly empty) finite tuples of formulæ, called contexts.

One possible description of these systems is based on sequent calculus.

Recall that a sequent $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ is an ordered pair where $\Gamma = \varphi_1, ..., \varphi_m$ and $\Delta = \psi_1, ..., \psi_n$ are (possibly empty) finite tuples of formulæ, called contexts.

Our systems can be axiomatized using the inference rules of the form

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash \Delta_1, \ \dots, \ \Gamma_k \vdash \Delta_k}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}$$

One possible description of these systems is based on sequent calculus.

Recall that a sequent $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ is an ordered pair where $\Gamma = \varphi_1, ..., \varphi_m$ and $\Delta = \psi_1, ..., \psi_n$ are (possibly empty) finite tuples of formulæ, called contexts.

Our systems can be axiomatized using the inference rules of the form

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash \Delta_1, \ \dots, \ \Gamma_k \vdash \Delta_k}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}$$

"from sequents $\Gamma_1 \vdash \Delta_1$, ... $\Gamma_k \vdash \Delta_k$ infer the sequent $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$."

One possible description of these systems is based on sequent calculus.

Recall that a sequent $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$ is an ordered pair where $\Gamma = \varphi_1, ..., \varphi_m$ and $\Delta = \psi_1, ..., \psi_n$ are (possibly empty) finite tuples of formulæ, called contexts.

Our systems can be axiomatized using the inference rules of the form

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash \Delta_1, \ \dots, \ \Gamma_k \vdash \Delta_k}{\Gamma \vdash \Delta}$$

"from sequents $\Gamma_1 \vdash \Delta_1$, ... $\Gamma_k \vdash \Delta_k$ infer the sequent $\Gamma \vdash \Delta$."

A proof in each of the systems consists of a succession of sequents each of which is derivable from the previous ones according to the inference rules.

We will be very sketchy about the axiomatics of these (well known and thoroughly investigated) systems;

We will be very sketchy about the axiomatics of these (well known and thoroughly investigated) systems; in fact, we will see below that the description of the semantics precisely reflects the nature of the corresponding inference rules.

We will be very sketchy about the axiomatics of these (well known and thoroughly investigated) systems; in fact, we will see below that the description of the semantics precisely reflects the nature of the corresponding inference rules.

In the semantics that we will consider, the formulæ will be interpreted by elements of a bounded distributive lattice;

We will be very sketchy about the axiomatics of these (well known and thoroughly investigated) systems; in fact, we will see below that the description of the semantics precisely reflects the nature of the corresponding inference rules.

In the semantics that we will consider, the formulæ will be interpreted by elements of a bounded distributive lattice; those of IPC will be interpreted by elements of a Heyting lattice;

We will be very sketchy about the axiomatics of these (well known and thoroughly investigated) systems; in fact, we will see below that the description of the semantics precisely reflects the nature of the corresponding inference rules.

In the semantics that we will consider, the formulæ will be interpreted by elements of a bounded distributive lattice;

those of IPC will be interpreted by elements of a Heyting lattice; and those of CPC—by elements of a Boolean lattice.

We will be very sketchy about the axiomatics of these (well known and thoroughly investigated) systems; in fact, we will see below that the description of the semantics precisely reflects the nature of the corresponding inference rules.

In the semantics that we will consider, the formulæ will be interpreted by elements of a bounded distributive lattice; those of IPC will be interpreted by elements of a Heyting lattice; and those of CPC—by elements of a Boolean lattice.

Moreover, conjunction will be interpreted by meet, disjunction by join, and implication by the Heyting implication in case of IPC and by the Boolean implication in case of CPC.

A model of one of our calculi in this semantics thus consists of a bounded distributive lattice *L* together with a valuation – an assignment to each propositional variable *p* of an element $v(p) \in L$.

A model of one of our calculi in this semantics thus consists of a bounded distributive lattice *L* together with a valuation – an assignment to each propositional variable *p* of an element $v(p) \in L$.

The valuation is then extended to all formulæ by induction: $\nu(\top) = 1$,

A model of one of our calculi in this semantics thus consists of a bounded distributive lattice *L* together with a valuation – an assignment to each propositional variable *p* of an element $v(p) \in L$.

The valuation is then extended to all formulæ by induction: $\nu(\top) = 1$, $\nu(\perp) = 0$,

A model of one of our calculi in this semantics thus consists of a bounded distributive lattice *L* together with a valuation – an assignment to each propositional variable *p* of an element $v(p) \in L$.

The valuation is then extended to all formulæ by induction: $\nu(\top) = 1$, $\nu(\perp) = 0$, $\nu(\varphi \land \psi) = \nu(\varphi) \land \nu(\psi)$,

A model of one of our calculi in this semantics thus consists of a bounded distributive lattice *L* together with a valuation – an assignment to each propositional variable *p* of an element $v(p) \in L$.

The valuation is then extended to all formulæ by induction: $v(\top) = 1$, $v(\perp) = 0$, $v(\varphi \land \psi) = v(\varphi) \land v(\psi)$, $v(\varphi \lor \psi) = v(\varphi) \lor v(\psi)$,

A model of one of our calculi in this semantics thus consists of a bounded distributive lattice *L* together with a valuation – an assignment to each propositional variable *p* of an element $v(p) \in L$.

The valuation is then extended to all formulæ by induction: $v(\top) = 1$, $v(\bot) = 0$, $v(\varphi \land \psi) = v(\varphi) \land v(\psi)$, $v(\varphi \lor \psi) = v(\varphi) \lor v(\psi)$, and for IPC (resp. CPC), *L* must be a Heyting lattice (resp. Boolean lattice)

A model of one of our calculi in this semantics thus consists of a bounded distributive lattice *L* together with a valuation – an assignment to each propositional variable *p* of an element $v(p) \in L$.

The valuation is then extended to all formulæ by induction: $v(\top) = 1$, $v(\bot) = 0$, $v(\varphi \land \psi) = v(\varphi) \land v(\psi)$, $v(\varphi \lor \psi) = v(\varphi) \lor v(\psi)$, and for IPC (resp. CPC), *L* must be a Heyting lattice (resp. Boolean lattice), and additionally $v(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) = v(\varphi) \rightarrow v(\psi)$.
A sequent $\varphi_1, ..., \varphi_m \vdash \psi_1, ..., \psi_n$ is said to be true in such a model if

 $\nu(\varphi_1) \wedge \cdots \wedge \nu(\varphi_m) \leq \nu(\psi_1) \vee \cdots \vee \nu(\psi_n)$

holds true in the lattice *L*.

A sequent $\varphi_1, ..., \varphi_m \vdash \psi_1, ..., \psi_n$ is said to be true in such a model if

$$\nu(\varphi_1) \wedge \cdots \wedge \nu(\varphi_m) \leqslant \nu(\psi_1) \vee \cdots \vee \nu(\psi_n)$$

holds true in the lattice *L*.

A calculus is said to be sound with respect to this semantics if any sequent which is derivable starting "from nothing", i. e. starting from an empty succession of sequents, is true in all models of this semantics.

A sequent $\varphi_1, ..., \varphi_m \vdash \psi_1, ..., \psi_n$ is said to be true in such a model if

$$\nu(\varphi_1) \wedge \cdots \wedge \nu(\varphi_m) \leqslant \nu(\psi_1) \vee \cdots \vee \nu(\psi_n)$$

holds true in the lattice *L*.

A calculus is said to be sound with respect to this semantics if any sequent which is derivable starting "from nothing", i. e. starting from an empty succession of sequents, is true in all models of this semantics.

In principle the only thing we need to know about the inference rules is that they ensure soundness of the corresponding system with respect to the semantics.

As a simple example, the inference rule

 $\overline{\varphi\vdash\varphi}$

corresponds to \leq to be reflexive in our lattice.

As a simple example, the inference rule

$\overline{\varphi\vdash\varphi}$

corresponds to \leq to be reflexive in our lattice.

As a more complicated example, consider the cut rule

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash \Delta_1, \varphi \quad \varphi, \Gamma_2 \vdash \Delta_2}{\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \Delta_1, \Delta_2}.$$

As a simple example, the inference rule

$$\varphi\vdash\varphi$$

corresponds to \leq to be reflexive in our lattice.

As a more complicated example, consider the cut rule

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash \Delta_1, \varphi \quad \varphi, \Gamma_2 \vdash \Delta_2}{\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \Delta_1, \Delta_2}.$$

This rule corresponds to the fact that in any distributive lattice, if

$$a_1 \leqslant b_1 \lor c$$
 and $c \land a_2 \leqslant b_2$,

As a simple example, the inference rule

$$\varphi\vdash\varphi$$

corresponds to \leq to be reflexive in our lattice.

As a more complicated example, consider the cut rule

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash \Delta_1, \varphi \quad \varphi, \Gamma_2 \vdash \Delta_2}{\Gamma_1, \Gamma_2 \vdash \Delta_1, \Delta_2}.$$

This rule corresponds to the fact that in any distributive lattice, if

$$a_1 \leqslant b_1 \lor c$$
 and $c \land a_2 \leqslant b_2$,

then

$$a_1 \wedge a_2 \leqslant b_1 \vee b_2.$$

A calculus is said to be **complete** with respect to a class of models in this semantics if any sequent which is true in all models from that class is derivable in the above sense.

A calculus is said to be **complete** with respect to a class of models in this semantics if any sequent which is true in all models from that class is derivable in the above sense.

A standard technique to prove completeness of a given calculus is the well-known Lindenbaum-Tarski construction.

A calculus is said to be **complete** with respect to a class of models in this semantics if any sequent which is true in all models from that class is derivable in the above sense.

A standard technique to prove completeness of a given calculus is the well-known Lindenbaum-Tarski construction. Namely, one can take the lattice of provable equivalence classes of formulæ.

A calculus is said to be **complete** with respect to a class of models in this semantics if any sequent which is true in all models from that class is derivable in the above sense.

A standard technique to prove completeness of a given calculus is the well-known Lindenbaum-Tarski construction. Namely, one can take the lattice of provable equivalence classes of formulæ.

The formulæ φ and ψ are called provably equivalent if the sequents $\varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\psi \vdash \varphi$ are both derivable in the calculus.

A calculus is said to be **complete** with respect to a class of models in this semantics if any sequent which is true in all models from that class is derivable in the above sense.

A standard technique to prove completeness of a given calculus is the well-known Lindenbaum-Tarski construction. Namely, one can take the lattice of provable equivalence classes of formulæ.

The formulæ φ and ψ are called provably equivalent if the sequents $\varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\psi \vdash \varphi$ are both derivable in the calculus.

Identifying provably equivalent formulæ one obtains a lattice of appropriate type equipped with the valuation v which assigns to a formula φ its equivalence class.

A calculus is said to be **complete** with respect to a class of models in this semantics if any sequent which is true in all models from that class is derivable in the above sense.

A standard technique to prove completeness of a given calculus is the well-known Lindenbaum-Tarski construction. Namely, one can take the lattice of provable equivalence classes of formulæ.

The formulæ φ and ψ are called provably equivalent if the sequents $\varphi \vdash \psi$ and $\psi \vdash \varphi$ are both derivable in the calculus.

Identifying provably equivalent formulæ one obtains a lattice of appropriate type equipped with the valuation v which assigns to a formula φ its equivalence class.

In this way, we obtain a model, and it is then not difficult to see that a sequent is derivable iff it is true in this model.

However the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction as a rule produces a large lattice which is very difficult to describe.

However the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction as a rule produces a large lattice which is very difficult to describe.

That's where the representation theorems can help.

However the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction as a rule produces a large lattice which is very difficult to describe.

That's where the representation theorems can help. One of their virtues is that they provide completeness of our calculi with respect to the models whose underlying lattices are easier to work with.

However the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction as a rule produces a large lattice which is very difficult to describe.

That's where the representation theorems can help. One of their virtues is that they provide completeness of our calculi with respect to the models whose underlying lattices are easier to work with.

Our first representation theorem of Lecture 2 implies that each bounded distributive lattice *L* is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice $\mathcal{U}(P)$ of upsets of some poset *P*.

However the Lindenbaum-Tarski construction as a rule produces a large lattice which is very difficult to describe.

That's where the representation theorems can help. One of their virtues is that they provide completeness of our calculi with respect to the models whose underlying lattices are easier to work with.

Our first representation theorem of Lecture 2 implies that each bounded distributive lattice *L* is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice $\mathscr{U}(P)$ of upsets of some poset *P*.

This theorem implies that the implication-free fragment of IPC is complete with respect to the relational semantics—the semantics in which the only models allowed are those in which formulæ are interpreted as upsets of a poset P, the conjunction as set-theoretic intersection, and the disjunction as set-theoretic union.

Similarly, the representation of Heyting lattices provides us with the following completeness of IPC:

Similarly, the representation of Heyting lattices provides us with the following completeness of IPC:

Relational completeness of IPC: If we interpret formulæ of IPC as upsets, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union

Similarly, the representation of Heyting lattices provides us with the following completeness of IPC:

Relational completeness of IPC: If we interpret formulæ of IPC as upsets, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as

$$P - \downarrow (\nu(\varphi) - \nu(\psi)) \\ = \{ w \in P : \text{ for all } w' \ge w, \text{ if } w' \in \nu(\varphi), \text{ then } w' \in \nu(\psi) \},\$$

Similarly, the representation of Heyting lattices provides us with the following completeness of IPC:

Relational completeness of IPC: If we interpret formulæ of IPC as upsets, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as

$$P - \downarrow (\nu(\varphi) - \nu(\psi)) \\ = \{ w \in P : \text{ for all } w' \ge w, \text{ if } w' \in \nu(\varphi), \text{ then } w' \in \nu(\psi) \},\$$

then IPC is complete with respect to the class of all posets.

Similarly, the representation of Heyting lattices provides us with the following completeness of IPC:

Relational completeness of IPC: If we interpret formulæ of IPC as upsets, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as

$$P - \downarrow (\nu(\varphi) - \nu(\psi))$$

= { $w \in P$: for all $w' \ge w$, if $w' \in \nu(\varphi)$, then $w' \in \nu(\psi)$ },

then IPC is complete with respect to the class of all posets. For those familiar with Kripke semantics of IPC,

Similarly, the representation of Heyting lattices provides us with the following completeness of IPC:

Relational completeness of IPC: If we interpret formulæ of IPC as upsets, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as

$$P - \downarrow (\nu(\varphi) - \nu(\psi)) \\ = \{ w \in P : \text{ for all } w' \ge w, \text{ if } w' \in \nu(\varphi), \text{ then } w' \in \nu(\psi) \},\$$

then IPC is complete with respect to the class of all posets.

For those familiar with Kripke semantics of IPC, the above completeness is just a reformulation of the Kripke completeness of IPC.

Similarly, the representation of Heyting lattices provides us with the following completeness of IPC:

Relational completeness of IPC: If we interpret formulæ of IPC as upsets, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as

$$P - \downarrow (\nu(\varphi) - \nu(\psi)) \\ = \{ w \in P : \text{ for all } w' \ge w, \text{ if } w' \in \nu(\varphi), \text{ then } w' \in \nu(\psi) \},\$$

then IPC is complete with respect to the class of all posets.

For those familiar with Kripke semantics of IPC, the above completeness is just a reformulation of the Kripke completeness of IPC. Put differently, Kripke completeness of IPC is nothing more but a representation of Heyting lattices as lattices of upsets of posets! In the case of Boolean lattices the order \leq of the poset *P* becomes trivial.

In the case of Boolean lattices the order \leq of the poset *P* becomes trivial. Thus we arrive at the following well-known completeness of CPC:

In the case of Boolean lattices the order \leq of the poset *P* becomes trivial. Thus we arrive at the following well-known completeness of CPC:

Completeness of CPC: If we interpret formulæ of CPC as subsets of a set, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as $(S - \nu(\varphi)) \cup \nu(\psi)$, then CPC is complete with respect to the class of all sets.

In this case further improvements are possible.

In this case further improvements are possible. In particular it is sufficient to restrict our attention to a unique singleton set $\{s\}$.

In this case further improvements are possible. In particular it is sufficient to restrict our attention to a unique singleton set $\{s\}$. The corresponding Boolean lattice is the two element Boolean lattice $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$.

In this case further improvements are possible. In particular it is sufficient to restrict our attention to a unique singleton set $\{s\}$. The corresponding Boolean lattice is the two element Boolean lattice $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$. If we denote the elements of $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$ by \bot and \top , then we arrive at the well-known result that theorems of CPC are exactly the formulæ true in all models based on $\{\bot, \top\}$, which are known as tautologies.

In this case further improvements are possible. In particular it is sufficient to restrict our attention to a unique singleton set $\{s\}$. The corresponding Boolean lattice is the two element Boolean lattice $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$. If we denote the elements of $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$ by \bot and \top , then we arrive at the well-known result that theorems of CPC are exactly the formulæ true in all models based on $\{\bot, \top\}$, which are known as tautologies.

It is important to mention that a similar reduction is not possible in the case of IPC.

In this case further improvements are possible. In particular it is sufficient to restrict our attention to a unique singleton set $\{s\}$. The corresponding Boolean lattice is the two element Boolean lattice $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$. If we denote the elements of $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$ by \bot and \top , then we arrive at the well-known result that theorems of CPC are exactly the formulæ true in all models based on $\{\bot, \top\}$, which are known as tautologies.

It is important to mention that a similar reduction is **not** possible in the case of IPC. In fact, no single finite model suffices for completeness of IPC!

In this case further improvements are possible. In particular it is sufficient to restrict our attention to a unique singleton set $\{s\}$. The corresponding Boolean lattice is the two element Boolean lattice $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$. If we denote the elements of $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$ by \bot and \top , then we arrive at the well-known result that theorems of CPC are exactly the formulæ true in all models based on $\{\bot, \top\}$, which are known as tautologies.

It is important to mention that a similar reduction is **not** possible in the case of IPC. In fact, no single finite model suffices for completeness of IPC! This is a famous result of Kurt Gödel from the thirties.

In this case further improvements are possible. In particular it is sufficient to restrict our attention to a unique singleton set $\{s\}$. The corresponding Boolean lattice is the two element Boolean lattice $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$. If we denote the elements of $\mathscr{P}(\{s\})$ by \bot and \top , then we arrive at the well-known result that theorems of CPC are exactly the formulæ true in all models based on $\{\bot, \top\}$, which are known as tautologies.

It is important to mention that a similar reduction is **not** possible in the case of IPC. In fact, no single finite model suffices for completeness of IPC! This is a famous result of Kurt Gödel from the thirties.

On the other hand, IPC is complete with respect to an infinite class of finite models—another famous result from the thirties by Stanislaw Jaśkowski.
Our topological representation theorem implies that each bounded distributive lattice L is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of all open subsets of some topological space X. Our topological representation theorem implies that each bounded distributive lattice L is isomorphic to a sublattice of the lattice of all open subsets of some topological space X.

This theorem implies that the implication-free fragment of IPC is complete with respect to the topological semantics—the semantics in which the only models allowed are those in which formulæ are interpreted as open subsets of a topological space X, the conjunction as set-theoretic intersection, and the disjunction as set-theoretic union.

The topological representation of Heyting lattices provides us with the following completeness of IPC, established by Tarski in the late 1930ies:

The topological representation of Heyting lattices provides us with the following completeness of IPC, established by Tarski in the late 1930ies:

Topological completeness of IPC: If we interpret formulæ of IPC as open subsets, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as

$$X - \overline{\nu(\varphi) - \nu(\psi)} = \operatorname{int}((X - \nu(\varphi)) \cup \nu(\psi)),$$

then IPC is complete with respect to the class of all topological spaces.

Similarly, the topological representation of Boolean lattices provides us with the following completeness of CPC:

Similarly, the topological representation of Boolean lattices provides us with the following completeness of CPC:

Topological completeness of CPC: If we interpret formulæ of CPC as clopens, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as $(X - \nu(\varphi)) \cup \nu(\psi)$, then CPC is complete with respect to the class of all topological spaces.

Similarly, the topological representation of Boolean lattices provides us with the following completeness of CPC:

Topological completeness of CPC: If we interpret formulæ of CPC as clopens, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as $(X - \nu(\varphi)) \cup \nu(\psi)$, then CPC is complete with respect to the class of all topological spaces.

In fact for CPC, as we already saw, it is enough to restrict our attention to discrete spaces

Similarly, the topological representation of Boolean lattices provides us with the following completeness of CPC:

Topological completeness of CPC: If we interpret formulæ of CPC as clopens, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as $(X - \nu(\varphi)) \cup \nu(\psi)$, then CPC is complete with respect to the class of all topological spaces.

In fact for CPC, as we already saw, it is enough to restrict our attention to discrete spaces or even to a single one-element space.

Similarly, the topological representation of Boolean lattices provides us with the following completeness of CPC:

Topological completeness of CPC: If we interpret formulæ of CPC as clopens, \land as set-theoretic intersection, \lor as set-theoretic union, and $\phi \rightarrow \psi$ as $(X - \nu(\varphi)) \cup \nu(\psi)$, then CPC is complete with respect to the class of all topological spaces.

In fact for CPC, as we already saw, it is enough to restrict our attention to discrete spaces or even to a single one-element space.

This restriction is again not possible in the case of IPC.





To summarize:

• We have developed basics of lattice theory.

- We have developed basics of lattice theory.
- We have characterized distributive lattices as those lattices which do not have the diamond and pentagon configurations.

- We have developed basics of lattice theory.
- We have characterized distributive lattices as those lattices which do not have the diamond and pentagon configurations.
- We have introduced Boolean lattices and Heyting lattices, which form important subclasses of the class of distributive lattices.

- We have developed basics of lattice theory.
- We have characterized distributive lattices as those lattices which do not have the diamond and pentagon configurations.
- We have introduced Boolean lattices and Heyting lattices, which form important subclasses of the class of distributive lattices.
- We have developed the Birkhoff duality between finite distributive lattices and finite posets.

• We have extended the Birkhoff duality to the Priestley duality.

- We have extended the Birkhoff duality to the Priestley duality.
- We have obtained the Stone duality for Boolean lattices and the Esakia duality for Heyting lattices from the Priestley duality.

- We have extended the Birkhoff duality to the Priestley duality.
- We have obtained the Stone duality for Boolean lattices and the Esakia duality for Heyting lattices from the Priestley duality.
- We have also developed the spectral duality which is an alternative of the Priestley duality.

- We have extended the Birkhoff duality to the Priestley duality.
- We have obtained the Stone duality for Boolean lattices and the Esakia duality for Heyting lattices from the Priestley duality.
- We have also developed the spectral duality which is an alternative of the Priestley duality.
- As a result we have obtained relational and topological representations of bounded distributive lattices, Heyting lattices, and Boolean lattices.

- We have extended the Birkhoff duality to the Priestley duality.
- We have obtained the Stone duality for Boolean lattices and the Esakia duality for Heyting lattices from the Priestley duality.
- We have also developed the spectral duality which is an alternative of the Priestley duality.
- As a result we have obtained relational and topological representations of bounded distributive lattices, Heyting lattices, and Boolean lattices.
- We have given applications of these representation theorems to logic.

- We have extended the Birkhoff duality to the Priestley duality.
- We have obtained the Stone duality for Boolean lattices and the Esakia duality for Heyting lattices from the Priestley duality.
- We have also developed the spectral duality which is an alternative of the Priestley duality.
- As a result we have obtained relational and topological representations of bounded distributive lattices, Heyting lattices, and Boolean lattices.
- We have given applications of these representation theorems to logic. In particular, we have discussed several relational and topological completeness theorems for the intuitionistic and classical logics, and their implication-free fragments.





There's a lot more to be said.



There's a lot more to be said.

But everything has its end!



There's a lot more to be said.

But everything has its end!

So



There's a lot more to be said.

But everything has its end!

So

THANK YOU!!!